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Abstract 
This research examines the relevance of inclusive development in modulating the role of 
governance on environmental degradation. The study focuses on forty-four countries in sub-
Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The Generalised Method of Moments is employed as 
the empirical strategy and CO2 emissions per capita is used to measure environmental pollution. 
Bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are employed, notably: political governance 
(consisting of political stability/no violence and “voice and accountability”), economic 
governance (encompassing government effectiveness and regulation quality), institutional 
governance (entailing corruption-control and the rule of law), and general governance (a 
composite measure of political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance). The following main findings are established. First, the underlying net effect in the 
moderating role of inclusive development in the governance-CO2 emissions nexus is not 
significant in regressions pertaining to political governance and economic governance. Second, 
there are positive net effects from the relevance of inclusive development in modulating the 
effects of regulation quality, economic governance and general governance on CO2 emissions. 
The significant and insignificant effects are elucidated. Policy implications are discussed. 
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The relevance of inclusive development in governance for environmental sustainability in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) is a worthwhile research endeavour for a multitude of reasons, inter alia: 
(i) inclusive development and sustainability are closely aligned with the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda; (ii) the importance of good governance in promoting environmental 
sustainability, and (iii) gaps in the literature. These three factors are expanded in the same order 
as they are highlighted.  
 First, in accordance with Amavilah, Asongu and Andrés (2017), inclusive development 
and environmental sustainability are closely linked in the prism that, for sustained development 
to reflect sustainability, it is worthwhile for it to be inclusive while for the inclusive 
development to mirror sustainability, it should withstand the test of being sustained over time. 
The underlying connections are relevant to the context of this research because we are focusing 
on inclusive development and environmental sustainability: the former by engaging the 
inequality-adjusted human development index as a policy variable and the latter because 
environmental degradation is understood as a policy syndrome that stifles environmental 
sustainability4. A mechanism by which the policy variable can be employed to tackle the policy 
syndrome is good governance.  
 Second, there is abundant literature that is consistent on the importance of good 
governance in the improvement of socio-economic and environmental outcomes in SSA. The 
attendant literature broadly supports the view that political will is essential in addressing the 
policy syndrome of environmental degradation, especially in the light of global targets and 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Some notable studies advancing this perspective 
include: Jones(2003), Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b, 2010), Afful-Koomson (2012), Apkan and 
Akpan (2012),  Hongwu (2013, Chemutai (2009), Odhiambo (2014a, 2014b),  Anyangwe 
(2014), Akinyemi, Alege, Osabuohien and  Ogundipe (2015), Carl (2016), Akinyemi, Efobi, 
Asongu  and Osabuohien (2018), Jarrett(2017), Asongu, le Roux and Biekpe (2018), Asongu 
(2018a) and Efobi, Tanankem, Orkoh, Atata, Akinyemi and Beecroft (2018).  
 Third, to the best of our knowledge, in the light of the issues and narratives covered in 
the preceding paragraphs, the extant literature has failed to assess linkages between inclusive 
development, governance and environmental degradation. The study closest to the present 
research is by Asongu and Odhiambo (2018a), which has investigated how environmental 
                                                          
4 The conception and definition of policy syndrome in the light of contemporary inclusive development literature 
is “inequality” or “growth that is not inclusive” (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Tchamyou, Erreygers & 
Cassimon, 2018). Asongu (2017) understands the concept of policy syndrome as a gap in knowledge economy 
between two countries. Within the framework of this study, policy syndrome represents environmental degradation 
and/or pollution.  
4 
 
degradation affects inclusive human development in SSA. This research expands the underlying 
study on two main fronts. On the one hand, the focus is on environmental degradation instead 
of inclusive development. Hence, the outcome variable of the underlying study is employed as 
a policy variable in this research. On the other hand, governance channels are engaged as 
mechanisms by which inclusive development affects CO2 emissions. This is contrary to the 
underlying study which does not engage channels by which the independent variable of interest 
affects the outcome variable.  Therefore, the research question this study attempts to answer is 
the following: how does inclusive development modulate the effect of governance on 
CO2emissions in SSA? 
 The intuition motivating the investigation of nexuses between inclusive development, 
governance and environmental degradation is simple to follow. First and foremost, the fact that 
governance standards affect environmental quality is “a given”, as supported by attendant 
studies in the previous paragraph. Second, the equitable distribution of fruits from economic 
prosperity also affects the manner in which citizens contribute to CO2 emissions. Accordingly, 
when the fruits of economic prosperity are equitably distributed across the population, average 
wealth increases and the average citizen is more likely to contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions. Third, inclusive human development can plausibly affect how governance standards 
affect CO2 emissions. This is essentially because inclusive development and governance are 
also intricately connected (Andres, Asongu and Amavilah, 2015). For instance, economic 
governance within the framework of this study is understood as the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. This definition aligns with the 
hypothetical nexus between inclusive development and environment degradation. On the 
empirical front, the empirical exercise is tailored such that inclusive human development 
complements governance to affect environmental degradation. To make this assessment, the 
net effects (from the unconditional impact of governance on CO2 emissions and the conditional 
impact from the interaction between governance and inclusive development) are used to assess 
how inclusive development modulates the effect of governance on CO2 emissions. 
 In the light of the above, this research is also positioned as an empirical study that is 
focused on theory-building. Hence, it is in accordance with recent empirical literature 
supporting the framework that applied econometrics motivated by plausible intuition, is a useful 
scientific activity. Moreover, in line with the attendant literature, applied econometrics should 
not exclusively be limited to the acceptance or rejection of existing theoretical underpinnings 
(Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
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 The rest of the research proceeds as follows. Section 2 covers the data and the 
methodology. The empirical results are disclosed and discussed in section 3 while section 4 
concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
The focus of this research is on 44 SSA countries with data for the period 2000-20125. Of the 
49 countries in SSA, only 44 are involved in the study because of data availability constraints 
at the time of the study. The data is obtained from a multitude of sources, namely: (i) the 
inclusive human development index used as the moderating variable is obtained from the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP); (ii) six governance variables (political 
stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, 
corruption-control and the rule of law) are sourced from World Governance Indicators of the 
World Bank, and (iii) the three control variables (i.e. gross domestic product growth rate, 
population growth and education quality) and the proxy for environmental degradation (i.e. CO2 
emissions per capita) are from World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
 The outcome variable of environmental pollution which is proxied by CO2 emissions 
per capita is consistent with recent environmental pollution literature in SSA (Asongu, 2018a, 
2018b). The governance mechanisms from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) are 
increasingly being used in the governance literature. Some recent studies that have employed 
these six governance indicators include: Andrés et al. (2015), Oluwatobi, Efobi, Olurinola and 
Alege (2015), Ajide and Raheem (2016a, 2016b) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017b). 
According to the attendant literature: “The first concept is about the process by which those in 
authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice and accountability and 
political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of government to formulate and 
implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness. The last, but by no means least, regards the respect for citizens and 
the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Institutional Governance): 
rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041). 
                                                          
5The 44 countries are: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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 The adopted inclusive development variable is the inequality-adjusted human 
development (IHDI), which is the human development index (HDI) that is adjusted for 
inequality. Accordingly, the “The human development index (HDI) denotes a national mean of 
results in three principal dimensions, notably: health and long life, knowledge and basic living 
standards. The IHDI goes a step further by adjusting the HDI to prevalent levels of inequality 
in the aforementioned three dimensions. In other words, the IHDI also takes into consideration 
the manner in which the three underlying achievements are distributed within the 
population”(Asongu et al., 2017, p. 355). 
 Three main control variables are adopted in order to account for variable omission bias, 
notably: gross domestic product (GDP) growth, population growth and education quality. The 
first-two variables are intuitively expected to increase CO2 emissions while the sign of the third 
variable cannot be established with certainty.  Accordingly, it is natural to infer that economic 
prosperity in terms of GDP growth is associated with more CO2 emissions. This is essentially 
because GDP growth is associated with more production and consumption of goods and 
services which entail processes that emit greenhouse gases. In the same vein, a rising population 
should be associated with enhanced possibilities of consuming commodities and engaging in 
economic activities, which ultimately bear positively on their contributions to greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 The adopted education variable in this study is the pupil-teacher ratio. Compared to 
other levels of education, it is preferred essentially because of: (i) data availability constraints 
in obtaining other indicators of higher learning and (ii) the documented evidence that compared 
to higher levels of education, primary education has comparatively higher development 
externalities in countries at initial stages of industrialization. Some studies supporting this thesis 
include:  Petrakis and Stamakis (2002) and Asiedu (2014). In the light of the measurement of 
this education indicator, an increasing ratio denotes decreasing education quality because more 
pupils are required to be accommodated by the same teacher, ceteris paribus. Hence, while we 
expect higher quality education to reduce CO2 emissions, the knowledge imparted on 
environmental degradation may not require the ability of a single teacher to focus exclusively 
on a select number of pupils. It follows that the sign of this variable cannot be established a 
priori.  
The limitation to only three control variables is motivated by the failure of estimated 
models to pass post-estimation diagnostics tests when more instruments are involved in the 
regressions. Accordingly, even when instruments are collapsed in the estimation process, such 
proliferation of instruments is still apparent. The use of three control variables is not uncommon 
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in the scholarly literature given that Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012) have used two 
control variables, while Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017c) and Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) 
have used no control variable.The definitions and sources of the variables are provided in 
Appendix 1 while the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 presents the 
correlation matrix. For lack of space, the appendices are available upon request. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
In order to increase the robustness of the findings, the research is consistent with recent 
literature in reducing the governance dimensions by means of PCA. Attendant African 
knowledge economy and governance studies on which this research builds include: Tchamyou 
(2017) and Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019). Accordingly, the purpose of the 
PCA is to reduce the six governance dynamics into four main dimensions: (i) political 
stability/no violence and “voice & accountability” are reduced to political governance; (ii) 
government effectiveness and regulation quality are reduced to economic governance; (iii) 
corruption-control and the rule of law are reduced to institutional governance and (iv) political 
stability/no violence, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness, regulation quality, 
corruption-control and the rule of law are reduced to general governance.  
 The criteria used to select common factors are from the Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) 
rule of thumb which requires that eigenvalues that are higher than the mean should be retained. 
The corresponding retained eigenvalue should also reflect at least 70% of combined information 
in the constituent indicators. The findings of the PCA are presented in Table 1. From the table, 
it is apparent that the underlying criteria are respected in the retention of the common factors: 
political governance (Polgov), economic governance (Ecogov), institutional governance 
(Instgov) and General governance (G.Gov) respectively, reflect eigenvalues (variations) of 
1.671, 1.878, 1.861 and 4.892 (83.5 %, 93.9 %, 93.0 % and 81.50%). 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
2.2.2 GMM Specification  
Borrowing from Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b), the mode of empirical analysis adopted in this 
research is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Drawing on the underlying literature, 
at least four factors motivate the choice of the empirical strategy. First, the outcome variable of 
CO2 emissions is persistent because the correlation between its level and first lags values is 
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higher than the threshold of 0.800, which is the rule of thumb for establishing persistence in an 
indicator (Tchamyou et al., 2019). Second, the number of countries under investigation is 
higher than the number of periods in each country. Third, cross-country variations are 
considered in the empirical analysis because the data structure is panel. Fourth, the concern of 
endogeneity is tackled from two fronts: (i) reverse causality or simultaneity is addressed with 
the help of a process of instrumentation and (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity is also taken on 
board by means of controlling for time invariant omitted variables.  
The methodological framework adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
approach. This improvement of the GMM technique (from Arellano & Bover, 1995) has been 
established to restrict the proliferation of instruments in contemporary development literature, 
notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu, (2016b), Tchamyou et al. (2019) and Boateng, Asongu, 
Akamavi and Tchamyou (2018).  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where tiCO , is the CO2 emissions variable of  country i  in  period t , 0 is a constant, HD
represents inclusive human development, G  entails governance   (political stability, voice & 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and corruption-control, 
political governance, economic governance, institutional governance and general governance), 
HDG  denotes an interaction between a CO2 emission variable and governance (“political 
stability” × “inclusive development”, “voice & accountability” × “inclusive development”, 
“government effectiveness” × “inclusive development”, “regulation quality” × “inclusive 
development”, “corruption-control” × “inclusive development”,  “rule of law” × “inclusive 
development”, “political governance” × “inclusive development”,   “economic governance” × 
“inclusive development”,   “institutional governance” × “inclusive development”,  and  “general 
governance” × “inclusive development”), W  is the vector of control variables (GDP growth, 
population growth and education quality), represents the coefficient of auto-regression which 
is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is enough to capture past 
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information, t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-specific effect and ti , is the error 
term.  
 
2.2.3 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
  
 In the light of the specification process in the previous section, this research is still 
consistent with that attendant contemporary literature in the strategy of identification and 
exclusion restrictions, notably: Asongu and Nwachukwu, (2016c), Tchamyou and Asongu 
(2017), Boateng et al. (2018), Meniago and Asongu(2018) and Tchamyou et al. (2019). In 
essence, the strategy of identification is such that the years are considered to be strictly 
exogenous variables while the endogenous explaining indicators are considered as endogenous 
explaining variables. Roodman (2009b) accords with this strategy of identification because he 
has argued that invariant variables cannot be endogenous after a first difference6.  
 Contingent on the framework of identification, the assumption of exclusion restriction 
is validated when the alternative hypothesis of the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
instrument exogeneity is rejected. This alternative hypothesis is the position that the instruments 
are not valid. In others words, it is also the stance that the endogenous variables are main 
channels by which the strictly exogenous variables affect the outcome variable or CO2 
emissions.  The underlying identification framework is broadly consistent with the standard 
instrumental variable (IV) strategy in which a rejection of the alternative hypothesis of the 
Sargan test is an indication that the instruments are valid (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 
2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d).  
 
3. Presentation of results 
 The empirical findings are disclosed in this section. Table 2 presents nexuses between 
political governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation while Table 3 
shows results of linkages between economic governance, inclusive development and 
environmental degradation. In Table 4, the findings on connections between institutional 
governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation are disclosed, whereas 
Table 5 focuses on linkages between general governance, inclusive development and 
environmental degradation. Four main information criteria are employed to assess the post-
estimation validity of the GMM findings7. Based on these criteria, the models are 
                                                          
6Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
7 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant 
because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan 
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overwhelmingly valid with a few exceptions, notably:  the first estimations on government 
effectiveness in Table 3 and general governance in Table 5 where the null hypothesis of the 
Hansen test is rejected. It is relevant to note that the Hansen test is robust but sensitive to the 
proliferation of instruments whereas the Sargan test is not robust but not sensitive to the 
proliferation of instruments. Hence, a cautious approach is to adopt the Hansen test and avoid 
the proliferation of instruments by ensuring that in every specification, the number of cross 
sections is higher than the corresponding number of instruments.  
 In order to assess the overall effect of the role of inclusive development in modulating 
the impact of governance on CO2 emissions, net effects are computed. The computation of these 
net effects entails both the conditional and the conditional effects of governance dynamics: the 
latter effect being the impacts from the estimates corresponding to the interaction between 
inclusive development and governance dynamics. For instance, in the second column of Table 
3, the net effect of inclusive development in modulating the relevance of regulation quality in 
CO2 emissions is 0.0459([0.551× 0.450] + [-0.202]). In the calculation, the average value of 
inclusive human development is 0.450, the unconditional impact of regulation quality is -0.202 
and conditional effect from the interaction between regulation quality and inclusive 
development is 0.551. This approach to computing net effects is consistent with contemporary 
literature on interactive regressions (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Agoba et al., 2019).  
 The underlying net effects cannot be established from Table 2 and Table 4 because at 
least one estimated coefficient required for their computations is not significant. In Table 3 and 
Table 5, there is a positive net effect from the relevance of inclusive development in modulating 
the effects of regulation quality, economic governance and general governance on CO2 
emissions.   
 
“Insert Tables 2-5 here”  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
4.1 Findings  
 
 This research has examined the relevance of inclusive development in modulating the 
role of governance on environmental degradation. The study focuses on 44 countries in sub-
                                                          
OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification 
or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. 
Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen 
OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. The Generalised Method of Moments is employed as 
empirical strategy and the CO2 emissions per capita is used to measure environmental pollution. 
Bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are employed notably: political governance 
(consisting of political stability/no violence and “voice & accountability”), economic 
governance (encompassing government effectiveness and regulation quality), institutional 
governance (entailing corruption-control and the rule of law) and general governance (a 
composite measure of political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance). The following main findings are established. First, the underlying net effect in the 
moderating role of the inclusive development in the governance-CO2 emissions nexus is not 
significant in regressions pertaining to political governance and economic governance. Second, 
there are positive net effects from the relevance of inclusive development in modulating the 
effects of regulation quality, economic governance and general governance on CO2 emissions.
  
 While the results have produced effects we did not anticipate, two facts are worth 
articulating before further discussion the results. On the one hand, unexpected findings have as 
much economic significance and policy relevance as expected findings. On the other hand, the 
insignificant findings also have as much economic significance and policy relevance as 
significant findings. Concerning the latter insights, the insignificant findings should not be 
understood within the framework of publication bias or a “file drawer” concern in social science 
research, where insignificant, null and unexpected findings are discarded in preference for 
significant, strong and expected results (Rosenberg, 2015; Franco, Malhotra & Simonovits, 
2014; Boateng et al., 2018). The underlying two points are expanded for policy implications. 
 
4.2 Conclusions  
 First, the unexpected findings can be explained from two perspectives which also double 
as policy implications. (i) When the fruits of economic prosperity are equitably distributed 
across the population by means of better education, more income and enhanced health facilities 
(i.e. components of the human development index), the average person is endowed with more 
opportunities of participating in the production and consumption processes that are positively 
correlated with the emission of greenhouses gases. (ii) Good governance is a necessary but not 
a sufficient mechanism for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This is partly because 
the governance standards in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are poor and partly because 
it might be relevant to complement the attendant governance mechanisms with other factors 
that are exogenous to greenhouse gas emissions in order to have the expected net negative sign 
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on CO2emissions. On the front of low governance standards in the sub-region, it is worthwhile 
to articulate that the governance variables have positive and negative values and hence, the 
negatively skewed distributions of the underlying variables (which is a feature of governance 
variables in Africa) can be construed as poor governance instead of good governance.  
 Second, the insignificant findings from institutional governance and political 
governance dynamics may be traceable to the fact that the conception and definition of inclusive 
human development is most aligned with economic governance. Accordingly, economic 
governance is conceived and defined in this study as the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public commodities. These public commodities are inherent components 
of the inclusive human development index.  
 Future studies can extend the established findings by considering alternative 
mechanisms by which environmental pollution can be mitigated in order to promote the green 
economy. Moreover, assessing if the findings withstand empirical scrutiny from country-
specific standpoints is also worthwhile. This latter recommendation for future research is 
motivated by the fact that country-specific effects are inherently eliminated in the GMM 
specification in order to control for endogeneity. While this study focuses exclusively on CO2 
emissions, there are other environmental problems that should also be the focus of future 
research, notably: land erosion, sea rise, biodiversity loss, rapid desertification, rainforest loss, 
and urban pollution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Afful-Koomson, T., (2012). “Governance Challenges for a Green Economy in Africa”, United 
Nations University,  
https://unu.edu/publications/articles/governance-challenges-for-a-green-economy-in-
africa.html(Accessed: 07/04/2017). 
 
Agoba, A. M., Abor, J., Osei, K. A., & Sa-Aadu, J. (2019). Do independent Central Banks 
Exhibit Varied  Bahaviour in Election and Non-Election Years: The Case of Fiscal Policy in 
Africa. Journal of African  Business: Forthcoming. 
13 
 
 
Ajide, K. B, & Raheem, I. D., (2016a). “Institutions-FDI Nexus in ECOWAS Countries”, 
Journal of African Business, 17(3), pp. 319-341.  
 
Ajide, K. B, & Raheem, I. D., (2016b). “The Institutional Quality Impact on Remittances in the 
ECOWAS Sub-Region”, African Development Review, 28(4), pp. 462–481. 
 
Akinyemi, O.,  Alege, P., Osabuohien, E.,  &  Ogundipe, A.,  (2015). “Energy Security and 
the Green Growth Agenda in Africa: Exploring Trade-offs and Synergies”, Department of 
Economics and Development Studies, Covenant University, Nigeria.  
 
Akinyemi, O., Efobi, U., Asongu, S., & Osabuohien, E., (2018). “Green Growth Strategy and 
Trade Performance in sub-Saharan Africa”, Department of Economics and Development 
Studies, Covenant University, Nigeria.  
 
Akpan, G. E. & Akpan, U. F. (2012). “Electricity Consumption, Carbon Emissions and 
Economic Growth in Nigeria”, International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2(4), 
pp. 292-306. 
 
Amavilah, V., Asongu, S. A., & Andrés, A. R., (2017). “Effects of globalization on peace and 
stability: Implications for governance and the knowledge economy of African countries”, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 122 (September), pp. 91-103. 
 
Andrés,  R. A, Asongu, S. A., &  Amavilah, V. H., (2015). “The Impact of Formal Institutions 
on Knowledge Economy”, Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 6(4), pp. 1034-1062. 
 
Anyangwe, E.  (2014). “Without energy could Africa’s growth run out of 
steam?”theguardian, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2014/nov/24/energy-infrastructure-clean-cookstoves-africa(Accessed: 08/09/2015). 
 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O., (1995), “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error components models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), pp. 29-52. 
 
Asiedu, E., (2014). “Does Foreign Aid in Education Promote Economic Growth? Evidence 
From Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Development, 16(1), pp. 37-59. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2017). “Knowledge Economy Gaps, Policy Syndromes and Catch-up 
Strategies: Fresh South Korean Lessons to Africa”, Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 8(1), 
pp. 211–253. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2018a). “CO2 emission thresholds for inclusive human development in sub-
Saharan Africa”, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 25(26), pp. 26005-26019. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2018b). “ICT, Openness and CO2 emissions in Africa”, Environmental 
Science and Pollution Research, 25(10), pp. 9351-9359. 
 
Asongu S. A. & De Moor, L., (2017). “Financial globalisation dynamic thresholds for financial 
development: evidence from Africa”, European Journal of Development Research, 29(1), pp. 
192–212.  
 
14 
 
Asongu, S. A., le Roux, S., Nwachukwu, J. C., & Pyke, C., (2019).“The Mobile Phone as an 
Argument for Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Information Technology & People, 
DOI: 10.1108/ITP-01-2018-0011. 
 
Asongu, S. A., le Roux, S., & Biekpe, N., (2017). “Environmental degradation, ICT and 
inclusive development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Energy Policy, 111(December), pp. 353-361. 
 
Asongu, S. A., le Roux, S.,, & Biekpe, N., (2018). “Enhancing ICT for environmental 
sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
127(February), pp. 209-216.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016a). “Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 
Spring”, Empirical Economics, 51(2), pp. 439-482. 
 
Asongu, S. A, & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016b). “The Mobile Phone in the Diffusion of 
Knowledge for Institutional Quality in Sub Saharan Africa”, World Development, 86 
(October), pp. 133-147. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016c). “The Role of Governance in Mobile Phones for 
Inclusive Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Technovation, 55-56 (September-
October), pp. 1-13.  
 
Asongu, S. A, & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016d). “Foreign aid and governance in Africa”, 
International Review of Applied Economics, 30(1), pp. 69-88.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017a).“Quality of Growth Empirics: Comparative 
Gaps, Benchmarking and Policy Syndromes”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 39(5), pp.861-882. 
 
Asongu, S. A, & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017b). “Is the Threat of Foreign Aid Withdrawal an 
Effective Deterrent to Political Oppression? Evidence from 53 African Countries”, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 51(1), pp. 201-221.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017c).“ Foreign Aid and Inclusive Development: 
Updated Evidence from Africa, 2005–2012”, Social Science Quarterly, 98(1), pp. 282-298.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2018a). “Environmental Degradation and Inclusive 
Human Development in Sub‐  Saharan Africa”, Sustainable Development,  
DOI: 10.1002/sd.1858. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Odhiambo, N. M., (2018b). “Basic formal education quality, information 
technology, and inclusive human development in sub‐ Saharan Africa”, Sustainable 
Development. DOI: 10.1002/sd.1914. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R., (2003), “Law and finance: why does legal origin 
matter?”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), pp. 653-675. 
 
Boateng, A., Asongu, S. A., Akamavi, R., & Tchamyou, V. S., (2018). “Information 
Asymmetry and Market Power in the African Banking Industry”, Journal of Multinational 
Financial Management, 44(March), pp. 69-83. 
 
15 
 
Bruno, G., De Bonis, R., & Silvestrini, A., (2012). “Do financial systems converge? New 
evidence from financial assets in OECD countries”. Journal of Comparative Economics, 40(1), 
pp. 141-155. 
 
Carl, D., (2016). The Green State in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
 
Chemutai, B., (2009). “Achieving Effective National Environmental Governance in Africa”, I 
SS Today,  https://issafrica.org/iss-today/achieving-effective-national-environmental-
governance-in-africa (Accessed: 07/04/2017).  
 
Efobi, U., Tanankem, B., Orkoh, E., Atata, S. N., Akinyemi, O., & Beecroft, I., (2018). 
“Environmental Pollution Policy of Small Businesses in Nigeria and Ghana: Extent and 
Impact”, Environmental Science and Pollution Research: DOI: 10.1007/s11356-018-3817-x. 
 
Franco, A., Malhotra, N., & Simonovits, G., (2014). “Publication Bias in the Social Sciences: 
Unlocking the File Drawer”, Science, 345(6203), pp. 1502-1505.  
 
Hongwu, L., (2013). “How to solve African governance and development issues: A perspective 
from China”,  BRIDGES AFRICA, 
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/how-to-solve-african-governance-and-
development-issues-a (Accessed: 07/04/2017). 
 
Jarrett, M. B., (2017). “Lights out: poor governance and Africa's energy crisis”, The Africa 
Report. http://www.theafricareport.com/News-Analysis/lights-out-africas.html (Accessed: 
01/12/2018).  
 
Jolliffe, I. T. (2002) Principal Component Analysis (2nd Ed.) New York: Springer.  
 
Jones, K. R., (2003). “Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Africa: Efforts and 
Problems in Implementation”, International Environmental Agreements, 3(2), pp.97-135.   
 
Kaiser, H. F. (1974) “An index of factorial simplicity” Psychometrika 39(1), pp. 31–36.  
 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A & Mastruzzi, M., (2010). “The worldwide governance indicators: 
Methodology and analytical Issues”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5430, 
Washington.  
 
Meniago, C., & Asongu, S. A., (2018). “Revisiting the finance-inequality nexus in a panel of 
African countries”, Research in International Business and Finance, 46(December), pp. 399-
419.  
 
Narayan, P.K., Mishra, S., & Narayan, S., (2011). “Do market capitalization and stocks traded 
converge? New global evidence”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(10), pp.2771-2781. 
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2009a). “Electricity consumption and economic growth in South Africa: a 
trivariate causality test”. Energy Economics, 31(5), pp. 635–640. 
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2009b). “Energy consumption and economic growth nexus in Tanzania: an 
ARDL bounds testing approach”. Energy Policy, 37 (2), pp. 617–622.  
 
16 
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2010). “Energy Consumption, Prices and Economic Growth in Three SSA 
Countries: A Comparative Study” Energy Policy, 38(5), pp. 2463-2469.  
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2014a). “Energy Dependence in Developing Countries: Does the Level of 
Income Matter'”, Atlantic Economic Journal, 42(1), pp. 65–77.  
 
Odhiambo, N. M., (2014b). “Electricity Consumption, Exports And Economic Growth in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: An ARDL-Bounds Testing Approach”, Journal of Developing 
Areas, 48( 4), pp.189-207.  
 
Oluwatobi, S., Efobi, U.R., Olurinola, O.I., Alege, P. (2015). “Innovation in Africa: Why 
Institutions Matter”, South African Journal of Economics, 83(3), pp. 390-410. 
 
Osabuohien, E. S., & Efobi, U. R., (2013). “Africa’s money in Africa”, South African Journal 
of Economics, 81(2), pp. 292-306.    
 
Petrakis, P. E., &Stamatakis, D. (2002). “Growth and educational levels: a comparative 
analysis”. Economics of Education Review, 21(2), pp. 513-521. 
 
Roodman, D., (2009a). “A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments”, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 71(1), pp. 135-158.  
 
Roodman, D., (2009b). “How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system 
GMM in Stata”, Stata Journal, 9(1), pp. 86-136.  
 
Rosenberg, M. S., (2005). “The file-drawer problem revisited: a general weighted method for 
calculating fail-safe numbers in meta-analysis”, Evolution, 59(2), pp. 464-468. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2017). “The Role of Knowledge Economy in African Business”. Journal of 
the Knowledge Economy, 8(4), pp. 1189-1228. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2019a). “Education, Lifelong learning, Inequality and Financial access: 
Evidence from African countries”. Contemporary Social Science.  
DOI: 10.1080/21582041.2018.1433314. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2019b).“The Role of Information Sharing in Modulating the Effect of 
Financial Access on Inequality”. Journal of African Business: Forthcoming. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., & Asongu, S. A., (2017). “Information Sharing and Financial Sector 
Development in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 18(7), pp. 24-49. 
 
Tchamyou, V.S., Erreygers, G., & Cassimon, D., (2019). “Inequality, ICT and Financial 
Access in Africa”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change,139(February), pp. 169-
184.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Econgov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
          
Table 2: Political governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Political Stability (PS) Voice & Accountability (VA) Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.875*** 0.949*** 0.887*** 0.951*** 0.872*** 0.944*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability (PS) 0.023 -0.016 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.716) (0.773)     
Voice & Accountability (VA) --- --- -0.102   -0.010 --- --- 
   (0.146) (0.906)   
Political Governance (Polgov) --- ---  --- 0.001 -0.045 
     (0.978) (0.249) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.175 0.187 0.418** 0.358 0.271 0.139 
 (0.567) (0.344) (0.047) (0.022) (0.244) (0.359) 
PS ×ID -0.011 0.113 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.944) (0.388)     
VA × ID --- --- 0.278* 0.127 --- --- 
   (0.050) (0.530)   
Polgov × ID --- --- --- --- 0.037 0.184** 
     (0.736) (0.048) 
GDP growth  --- 0.00004 --- 0.0001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.936)  (0.785)  (0.593) 
Population growth  --- 0.002 --- -0.002 --- 0.003 
  (0.880)  (0.869)  (0.784) 
Education  --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0005 
  (0.213)  (0.214)  (0.542) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.036) (0.012) (0.040) (0.018) (0.035) (0.016) 
AR(2) (0.120) (0.419) (0.111) (0.166) (0.126) (0.322) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.415) (0.315) (0.227) (0.468) (0.424) (0.366) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group --- (0.030) --- (0.042) --- (0.033) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.736) (0.692) (0.552) (0.815) (0.672) (0.742) 
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(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group --- (0.077) --- (0.077) --- (0.114) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.773) --- (0.948) --- (0.743) 
       
Fisher  447.73*** 833608*** 4661.87*** 81816.60*** 2036.66*** 99029.57*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 25 36 
Countries  42 41 42 41 42 41 
Observations  347 244 347 244 347 244 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation 
of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the estimations. The mean value of inclusive human development is 0.450.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Economic governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Regulation Quality 
 (RQ)  
Government Effectiveness 
(GE)  
Economic Governance 
(Ecogov) 
    
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.989*** 0.953*** 0.868*** 0.965*** 0.973*** 0.962*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation Quality  (RQ) -0.202** 0.030 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.010) (0.708)     
Government Effectiveness (GE) --- --- -0.217** 0.176 --- --- 
   (0.034) (0.224)   
Economic Governance (Ecogov) --- --- --- --- -0.075* 0.070 
     (0.099) (0.298) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.135 0.199 0.666** -0.164 -0.383** 0.236 
 (0.619) (0.359) (0.040) (0.478) (0.045) (0.190) 
RQ ×ID 0.551*** -0.030 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.824)     
GE × ID --- --- 0.556*** -0.290 --- --- 
   (0.005) (0.283)   
Ecogov × ID --- --- --- --- 0.223** -0.135 
     (0.012) (0.271) 
GDP growth  --- 0.00003 --- -0.0007 --- -0.00007 
  (0.946)  (0.166)  (0.899) 
Population growth  --- 0.008 --- 0.022** --- 0.019 
  (0.567)  (0.021)  (0.120) 
Education  --- -0.0009 --- -0.001** --- -0.001 
  (0.335)  (0.045)  (0.375) 
       
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
       
Net effects 0.0459 na 0.0332 na 0.0253 na 
       
AR(1) (0.048) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017) (0.049) (0.017) 
AR(2) (0.115) (0.203) (0.124) (0.378) (0.123) (0.234) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.202) (0.608) (0.070) (0.166) (0.252) (0.340) 
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DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group --- (0.028) --- (0.027) --- (0.047) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.393) (0.954) (0.163) (0.455) (0.511) (0.648) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group --- (0.057) --- (0.023) --- (0.024) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (1.000) --- (0.789) --- (0.991) 
       
Fisher  11323.77*** 543058*** 2547.04*** 62431.83*** 6895.42*** 52370.01*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 25 36 
Countries  42 41 42 41 42 41 
Observations  347 244 347 244 347 244 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation 
of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. The mean value of inclusive human development is 0.450.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Institutional governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
       
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
       
 Rule of  Law  
(RL)  
Corruption Control  
 (CC)  
Institutional Governance 
(Instgov) 
    
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.836*** 0.953*** 0.879*** 0.959*** 0.853*** 0.963*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law (RL) -0.075 -0.029 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.445) (0.739)     
Corruption Control  (CC) --- --- -0.190 -0.092 --- --- 
   (0.240) (0.248)   
Institutional  Governance (Instgov) --- --- --- --- -0.071 -0.019 
     (0.305) (0.707) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.670* 0.173 0.547 0.300* 0.426 0.076 
 (0.083) (0.368) (0.364) (0.064) (0.296) (0.551) 
RL ×ID 0.158 0.183 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.491) (0.315)     
CC × ID --- --- 0.416 0.205 --- --- 
   (0.215) (0.179)   
Instgov × ID --- --- --- --- --- 0.057 
      (0.569) 
GDP growth  --- -0.00005 --- 0.0001 --- 0.0001 
  (0.930)  (0.774)  (0.794) 
Population growth  --- -0.002 --- 0.009 --- 0.003 
  (0.839)  (0.337)  (0.799) 
Education  --- -0.0007 --- -0.0006 --- -0.0006 
  (0.339)  (0.240)  (0.437) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.033) (0.017) (0.031) (0.017) (0.032) (0.018) 
AR(2) (0.103) (0.319) (0.109) (0.241) (0.113) (0.257) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.165) (0.427) (0.119) (0.592) (0.141) (0.653) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group --- (0.050) --- (0.071) --- (0.048) 
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Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.276) (0.745) (0.262) (0.854) (0.227) (0.936) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group --- (0.066) --- (0.152) --- (0.091) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.940) --- (0.929) --- (0.998) 
       
Fisher  3280.27*** 90777.73*** 1570.90*** 528408*** 3294.44*** 0.963*** 
Instruments  25 36 25 36 25 36 
Countries  42 41 42 41 42 41 
Observations  347 244 347 244 347 244 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation 
of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. The mean value of inclusive human development is 0.450. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: General governance, inclusive development and environmental degradation 
     
 Dependent variable:  CO2 emissions per capita 
   
CO2 emissions (-1) 0.886*** 0.901*** 0.917***   0.966*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General Governance (Ggov) -0.062** -0.060*** 0.041* 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.059) (0.723) 
Inclusive Development (ID) 0.232 0.386*** 0.060 0.185 
 (0.280) (0.000) (0.734) (0.321) 
Ggov ×ID 0.156** 0.144*** -0.056 -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.131) (0.759) 
GDP growth  --- 0.0006* 0.0002 -0.00004 
  (0.076) (0.653) (0.923) 
Population growth  --- --- -0.020* 0.017 
   (0.084) (0.151) 
Education  --- --- --- -0.0005 
    (0.547) 
     
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net effects 0.0011 0.0048 na na 
     
AR(1) (0.036) (0.041) (0.057) (0.017) 
AR(2) (0.118) (0.125) (0.112) (0.218) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.084) (0.102) (0.198) (0.380) 
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.079) (0.005) (0.040) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.203) (0.170) (0.709) (0.728) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group --- --- (0.074) (0.060) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.200) (0.443) (0.916) 
     
Fisher  4224.87*** 9974.38*** 34319.29*** 45111.03*** 
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Instruments  25 29 32 36 
Countries  42 42 42 41 
Observations  347 342 306 244 
     
“*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation 
of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. The mean value of inclusive human development is 0.450”.  
 
 
